The partition of a pie model is integrated into a two-player difference game in state-space form with a finite horizon, in order to derive strategic bargaining outcomes in the framework of difference games. It is assumed that agreements are binding. In contrast to the model for the partition of a pie, the outcomes are not necessarily Pareto-efficient. For one-dimensional, linear-quadratic difference games, the subgame perfect bargaining outcome is unique, Paretoefficient, and analytically tractable. However, for higher dimensions the linear-quadratic structure breaks down and one has to resort to numerical methods.
Introduction
The framework of differential and difference games has proved to be very useful for the analysis of a variety of economic problems. When economic agents can be considered to have intertemporal objective functionals which depend on the use of their instruments and the state of the economy, and when the dynamics of the state of the economy can be described by a dynamic system in state-space form which is driven by the use of these instruments, this framework is appropriate. For example, the state of the economy can be the capital stock which accumulates by investments in fiscal policy games (Fischer 1980) , in capacity investment games (Reynolds 1987) , or in the Lancaster (1973) game of capitalism. Other examples are the sluggish price level which changes due to excess demand or supply in dynamic duopolistic competition (Fershtman and Kamien 1987) , the stock of resources which is depleted in resource extraction games (Reinganum and Stokey 1985) , and the concentration level of pollutants which increases due to emissions in the game of transboundary pollution control (van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw 1992) .
In most analyses of this kind, first the respective control problems are solved, and then noncooperative equilibria are derived in the resulting strategies. Depending on whether *The authors thank Joseph Plasmans, Jacob Engwerda, and Herbert Hamers for valuable suggestions. A large part of this research is financed by the Dutch Organization for Scientific Research, the decisions are taken simultaneously or sequentially, the Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concept is employed. Because of the correspondence with control techniques such as Pontryagin's maximum principle and Bellman's dynamic programming, the focus is mostly on open-loop outcomes and feedback outcomes. In the first decision model, it is assumed that the players only have initial state information and are committed to the initially chosen strategies, whereas in the second decision model it is assumed that the players only have current state information and are free to choose their actions at the time of play (e.g., Ba~ar and Olsder 1982). All these outcomes are generally not Pareto-efficient. To put it differently, if the players would cooperate, which means that they would decide jointly on all the available controls, they generally could reach a Pareto improvement over the noncooperative outcome. To be able to evaluate the incentives to cooperate, one of the Pareto-efficient outcomes can be selected and compared with the noncooperative outcome. The selection can be done on the basis of axiomatic bargaining theory (e.g., Roth 1979) and leads to, for example, the Nash or Kalai-Smorodinski bargaining solution. This approach was chosen to evaluate the incentives to cooperate in a linked macroeconometric model for two Common Market countries (de Zeeuw 1984) . This type of selection of Pareto improvements over feedback Nash equilibria in differential and difference games is also used in Ehtamo, Ruusunen, aad H~rn~il~iinen (1990) . Cooperative outcomes with trigger strategies for difference games in a dynamic programming framework are derived in Tolwinski (1982) and Haurie and Tolwinski (1984) . Selection is again based on the concepts of axiomatic bargaining theory.
Axiomatic bargaining theory is unsatisfactory, because the bargaining process is not described and because one would like to have a noncooperative underpinning of the cooperative outcome. For this purpose, the alternating offer model was developed, where the players in turn propose how to partition a pie (Rubinstein 1982) . This approach is called strategic bargaining theory. In the context of a difference game, a proposal consists of a joint strategy from a certain point in time onwards. One player makes a proposal, and the other player accepts or rejects the proposal. In the case of rejection, the players choose their disagreement action, and the game proceeds to the next period, in which it is the other player's turn to make a proposal for a joint strategy from that period in time onwards. As in the strategic bargaining model for the partition of a pie, these proposals have to be subgame-perfect. Strategic bargaining in the context of a difference game has already been suggested and analyzed (Stefanski and Cichocki 1986; Houba and de Zeeuw 1991) . However, in these articles (and in the articles on the integration of axiomatic bargaining theory and difference games), it is assumed that the disagreement actions are exogenously prescribed by, for example, the feedback or open-loop Nash equilibrium of the difference game. In this article, subgame perfectness is not only required for the proposals in the bargaining process but also for the disagreement actions, which are therefore endogenously determined in the unraveling of the optimal proposals.
Time is valuable in this model, because the possible gains of cooperation shrink as time passes by: there is a clear incentive for an early agreement. The unique equilibrium proposal of the partition of a pie model (Rubinstein 1982) is necessarily Pareto-efficient. It will be shown in this article, however, that a subgame-perfect equilibrium proposal for a joint strategy in a difference game may be Pareto-inefficient. The reason is that it is possible
